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Abstract. Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of 
perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the 
Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. 
In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception 
for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to 
defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core 
non-foundationalist ontology.
Setting up the problem
The current debate on Buddhist epistemology operates largely on the assumption 
that the theory of perception (pratyakṣa / mngon sum) of Dignāga-Dharmakīrti (from 
hereon Pramāṇika) is (perhaps) the only one found in Indian Buddhism. This view, 
if it is taken seriously and I believe people do take this seriously, has two major 
problematic implications for the Prsagika Madhyamaka of Candrakīrti: 
(1) to the extent one grants a theory of perception in the Prsagika Madhyamaka, 
the Prāsaṅgika must be seen as endorsing the epistemological project of the 
Pramāṇika (or else must be seen as endorsing1 the theory of perception of 
Brahmanical Nyāya and Mīmāṁsaka); 
(2) to the extent one rejects the theory of perception of Buddhist foundationalism 
and Brahmanical substantialism in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy, Candrakīrti must 
be read as rejecting2 all available theories of perception in Indian Buddhism. 
1 Mark Siderits (1981, 157) and (2011, 167–81) claims that Candrakīrti endorses Nyāya 
epistemology rather than Dignāga’s because Nyāya epistemology is less open to the reductionist 
project than is Yogācāra-Sautrāntika epistemology.
2 Tibetan Mdhyamikas Go rampa Bsod nams Senge (1969, 375, 382), Stag tsang Lots ba (2001, 
156–58), and Dge ‘dun chos ‘phel or Gendün Chöpel (Dge ‘dun chos ‘phel 1990, 161) argue that 
for the Prsagika Mdhyamika there can be no theory of perception. They argue that Candrakrti 
rejects perceptual cognitions as epistemic instrument unequivocally. Three key arguments are used 
to support their position: First, what is ontologically unreal and deceptive must also be epistemically 
flawed. Since all perceptions are ontologically deceptive and illusory in virtue of being causally 
conditioned, they must be epistemically flawed. Thus the so-called conventionally authoritative 
perceptual cognition must be rejected unequivocally. Second, perceptual cognitions all reify their 
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The former is problematic for it assumes Candrakīrti is being inconsistent. It 
presupposes that Candrakīrti synthesises foundationalist epistemology with non-
foundationalist ontology. So far we do not have any good evidence to support the claim 
that Candrakīrti blends the two irreconcilable positions, although it is clear enough 
from the works of Bhāvavevika, Śāntarakśita and Kamalaśla that the Svātantrika 
philosophers do synthesise the two systems. The latter is also problematic since it 
assumes that Candrakīrti is an epistemological sceptic, because it rules out the uses 
of any alternative theory of perception in the Prāsaṅgika.
In this paper, I propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception 
for Candrakīrti. I show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to 
defend a typical Prsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his 
core non-foundationalist ontology. The paper has two parts. In the first I present a 
brief summary of the theory of perception in the Pramṇika. This is only brief since 
my intention is only to highlight the basic principles underpinning the Pramāṇika’s 
foundationalist theory of perception, which enables us to properly assess the distinctive 
characteristics of the Prāsaṅgika’s theory of perception and easily distinguish it from 
the Pramāṇika’s foundationalist account. The second part of the paper contains three 
subsections and is where I present Candrakrti’s alternative account of perception; 
this forms the core of my paper. 
The pramāṇika’s pratyakṣa (perception)
In the Pramṇasammuccaya (PS), Dignga defines perception (pratyaka) as follows: 
‘Reliable cognition (pramṇa / tshad ma) constitutes perception (pratyaka) and 
inference (anumṇa). Reliable cognition has dual characteristics, for it is associated 
with (two) objects (prameyas / gzhal bya). There is no other reliable cognition [PS 
1.2] … Perception is free from the conception that weaves together name (nma / 
ming), class (jti / rigs), etc.’ (PS 1.3cd in Dignga 2003, 1).3 The Nyyapravea (NP = 
Tshad ma rigs ‘jug)4 adds more to this definition. ‘Valid knowledge (pratyyana / rab 
objects under the influence of primal ignorance. Thus they are all flawed and epistemically invalid. 
Third, no perceptual cognitions enable one to perceive ultimate truth directly, and hence all are 
invalid. 
3 Mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag // tshad ma’i mtshan nyid gnyis gzhal ba // de la rab sbyor 
phyir tshad ma // bzhan ni yod pa ma yin no //1.2//. Ming dang rus sogs su sbyor ba’i // rtog pa dang 
dral mngon sum mo //1.3cd//.
4 There is still an unsettled dispute between the two camps regarding the authorship of this text 
due to variance in the source of the evidence on which they each rely. The Tibetan school (represented 
by Satischandra Vidybhaṇa, Pandit Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, and Keith) attributes the text 
to Dignga, while the Chinese school (represented by Ui, Sugiura, Tucci, Tubianski and Mironov, 
etc.) attributes it to Dignga’s disciple, akara Svmin. See Dhruva 1930, i–xxxvii for an excellent 
synopsis of the debate at issue. The text I cited here from the Nyyapravea only clarifies Dignga’s 
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tu rtogs pa) of the nature of objects entails only two reliable cognitions (pramṇas): 
perception (pratyaka) and inference (anumna). Perception is free of conception 
(kalpanapoha / rtog dral). It is the cognition of objects like forms without the 
conceptions of name and class. Perception is a faculty, one that is acquired through 
the faculty of sense’ (Dignāga 1987, 7).5 
A recent Indian commentator on the Nyyapravea, Sempa Dorjee, explains 
that perception in Dignga’s definition has the sense of being cognition that is 
unconditioned by linguistic universals (sgra spyi) (thoughts and concepts associated 
with a name (nma / ming), such as ‘Devadatta’) and the object universal (don spyi) 
(thoughts and concepts associated with a class (jti / rigs), such as ‘Cowness’). Along 
this line, in Pramṇavinicaya (PV), chapter 1, Dharmakrti explains, 
conception is a linguistic cognition. Conception is a cognition to which the [object] 
appears fused with language. Perception is free from the conception because conception 
is impossible in the sensory cognition since it arises due to the force of objects. Because 
perception arises through the force of an object, it exclusively accords with the reality [of 
its object]. (Dharmakrti 2003c, 171)6 
Similarly, ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje (2006, 410) explains 
conception is a cognition that conceives (zhen rig) objects and language interwovenly: 
it conceives a pot for instance as though the abstract property of potness pervades all 
homogenous forms (namely individual pots having similar characteristics of being a pot), 
and it conceives many heterogeneous forms clustered together as universals (tshogs spyi) 
such as [forest] for [clusters of individual] trees.7 
definition of pratyaka offered in (PS 1.3cd in Dignga 2003, 1) and does not in any way represent a 
variance from the original position. So I will assume that it is authoritative to cite for the purpose of 
clarifying the definition of pratyaka at issue.
5 tmapratyyanrtha tu pratyakamanumna ca dve eva pramṇe // Tatra pratyaka 
kalpanpoha yajajnamarthe rpd nmajtydikalpanrahita / tadakamka prati vartata ite 
pratyaka //. Dorjee 1996, 179, 181: Bdag nyid kyis rab tu rtogs pa’i don la ni mngon sum dang / rjes 
su dpag pa ste / mtshad ma la gnyis nyid [du nges pa] yin no // de na mngon sum rtog pa dang dral ba 
ste / shes pa gang gzugs la sogs pa’i don la ming dang rigs la sogs pa’i rtog pa dang dral ba’o // de ni 
dbang po dang dbang po so so la yod a ni mngon sum zhes pa’o//. Grags pa rGyal mtshan’s Tibetan 
translation (1992, 163): Bdag nyid kyis rab tu rtogs par bya ba’i don la yang mngon sum dang / rjes 
su dpag pa’i mtshad ma nyid dag go // de la Mngon sum rtog pa dang dral zhes ba ste / gang gzugs la 
sogs pa’i don la ming dang rigs la sogs pa’i rtog pa dang dral ba de dbang po so so’i dbang po la yod 
a ni mngon sum zhes pa’o //. The latter version ignores the Sanskrit terms dve and jnam, obscuring 
the sense of the passage, whereas the former correctly reflect the Sanskrit version. 
6 Rtog pa de yang gang zhi na // rtog pa mngon par brjod can gyi / shes pa / rtog pa ni brjod pa 
dang ‘drer rung ba snang ba’i shes pa ste / de dang dral ba’o // dbang po’i shes pa la ni de srid pa ma 
yin te / don gyi mthu yis ni / yang dag skye ba yin phyir ro // gang gi phyir de don gyi nus pa las skyes 
pa na de’i rang bzhin kho na’i rjes su byed pa’i phyir ro //.
7 Rtog pa gang yin zhes na / kho na ri // ming don ‘dres par ‘dzin pa dang bum pa lta bu rang gi 
rigs can kun la khyab par ‘dzin pa dang // rigs mi mthun pa’ shing sogs du ma ‘dus pa’i tshogs spyi 
‘dzin pa’i zhen rig cig yin te //.
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In addition, Dharmakrti in his Pramṇavinicaya (PV) mentions several other 
aspects of perception. The PV 1 says perception and inference are the two forms of 
‘correct cognitions’ (yang dag pa’i shes pa) and defines correct cognition as ‘non-
deceptive with regards to its epistemic activities (don bya ba la slu ba med) because 
it engages with its objects by means of discrimination (yongs su bcad nas ‘jug)’ 
(Dharmakīrti 2003c, 167).8 Elsewhere the PV 1 says 
perception is a reliable cognition (pramāṇa) because it is non-deceptive (mi slu ba) with 
regards to the object. It is non-deceptive since it acquires its identity from its own [sensory 
faculty], whereas the sense of non-deceptivity is surely unreasonable when identity is 
acquired from another or else not acquired. (Dharmakīrti 2003c, 171)9 
Finally the PV 1 adds: ‘perception is non-erroneous or incontrovertible (abhrnta / 
mi khrul ba); it does not produce errors such as errors of visual blurriness, speedy 
motion, being in a [moving] boat, etc. Perception is cognition without the conception’ 
(Dharmakīrti 2003c, 171).10 
If we examine the features provided in these texts, we get the Pramāṇika’s definition 
of perception along these lines. 
• Reliable cognition (pramṇa) is valid knowledge (pratyyana / rab tu rtogs pa) 
since it cognises the nature (svalakaṇa / svabhva) of objects.
• Pratyaka is perception or a sensory cognition since it is acquired through the 
faculty of the senses.  
• Perception is one of the two reliable cognitions [the other being inference 
(anumna)], because there are only two kinds of objects (premayas)―unique 
reality or unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) and common reality or universals 
(samaṇyalakṣaṇa)―to know.
• Perception cognises its objects without weaving together name (nma / 
ming), class (jti / rigs) concepts, etc; hence perception is nonconceptual, 
(kalpanāpoha / rtog dral) because conception weaves together objects (artha 
/ don) with their name (nma / ming), class (jti / rigs), etc. 
• Perceptual cognition is non-deceptive with regards to its epistemic activities 
(don bya ba la slu ba med); it engages with its objects by means of discrimination 
(yongs su bcad nas ‘jug).
• Perception is reliable cognition (pramāṇa) because it is non-deceptive (mi slu 
ba) with regards to the object, and it acquires its identity from its own object.
8 Yang dag pa’i shes pa de ni rnam pa gnyis te / mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag / ces bya ba’o // 
‘de dag gis don yongs su bcad nas ‘jug pa na don bya ba la bslu ba med pa’i phyir ro /.
9 Mngon sum yang don la mi slu ba nyid las tshad ma yin no // mi slu ba yang de las bdag nyid thob 
pa’i phyir te / gzhan las byung ba’am ma byung pa’i yod pa de la nges par mi slu ba mi rigs pa’i phyir ro //.
10 Mngon sum rtog dral ma ‘khrul ba // rab rib dang myur du bskor ba dang / grur zhugs pa’i ‘khrul 
pa la sogs pas ‘khrul ba ma bskyed cing rnam par rtog pa med pa’i shes pa ni mngon sum mo //.
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• Perception is non-erroneous and incontrovertible (abhrnta / mi khrul ba); it 
does not produce errors such as the errors of visual blurriness, speedy motion, 
being in a [moving] boat, etc. 
Candrakīrti rejects all these features of the Pramāṇika’s theory of perception. His 
critiques are found dispersed throughout most of his writings, and they are quite well 
known. I therefore do not intend to dwell on them in any detail here except to stress 
that Candrakīrti’s critiques are intended to undermine both the Pramāṇika and Nyāya 
theories of perception; nevertheless I venture to mention the two primary sources of 
his critiques. 
The first one is Catuatakak (CŚT), chapter 13 in particular. Here Candrakrti 
rejects the Pramāṇika’s claim that perception is reliable cognition with regard to 
svalakaṇa / svabhva. Tom Tillemans’ (1990) Materials For The Study of ryadeva, 
Dharmapla And Candrakrti: The Catuataka Of ryadeva, Chapters XII And XIII, 
with The Commentaries of Dharmapla And Candrakrti provides us very useful 
notes on Candrakīrti’s critique, along with translations of relevant chapters from 
Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese texts. The CŚT also raises objections against the theory 
of perception in the Skhya and Nyya-Vaieika, which Candrakīrti draws from 
Nāgārjuna’s systematic critique of Nyāya epistemology in the Vigrahavyāvartanī 
(2005). Nāgārjuna’s critique is closely studied and examined in Mark Siderits’ (1980) 
excellent paper, ‘The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology I’. 
The second source of Candrakīrti’s critique of foundationalist epistemology is chapter 
1 of the Prasannapad (PP). Here Candrakīrti’s target is the Pramāṇika. Dan Arnold’s 
(2005) paper ‘Materials for a Madhyamika Critique of Foundationalism’ provides us 
a good, up-to-date annotated translation of this section. Mark Siderits’ (1981) ‘The 
Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology II’ provides us a good survey of the objections 
Candrakīrti employs to undermine the Pramāṇika’s account of epistemology. 
In his ‘Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology’, Siderits goes one step farther 
than what is warranted. He claims that Candrakrti having a list of four epistemic 
instruments is an indication that the Prsagika endorses the Nyya theory of 
knowledge. In Siderits’ words, ‘It is clear that he takes their account of the four 
pramṇas as a model description of our epistemic practices’ (1981, 157). In 
Moonshadows (2010, 167–81) Siderits’ claims that Candrakīrti endorses Nyāya 
epistemology rather than Dignāga’s because Nyāya epistemology is less open to the 
reductionist project than is Yogācāra-Sautrāntika epistemology. I agree with Siderits 
that there exist some superficial similarities between Candrakīrti’s epistemology 
and Naiyāyika’s in that the number of epistemic instruments accepted is the same. 
Unlike Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition, both Candrakīrti and Naiyāyika propose the 
intermingling role of perceptual and inferential cognitions in that they can share a 
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common epistemic object and that perceptual judgement must entail a determinate 
cognition rather than a purely indeterminate one as suggested by Dignāga. 
Do these superficial similarlies justify the claim that Candrakrti endorses the 
Nyya theory of epistemology? In my view, the evidence is less than convincing. Of 
course Candrakīrti and Naiyāyika epistemology have some shared features, at least 
on the surface. This is not suprising as these two traditions flourished side by side 
in India. The real question though is how far these similarities can take us. In my 
understanding not very far indeed! Take the case of perception for instance. For the 
Naiyāyikas, the definition of perception involves the senses (indriyas), their objects 
(artha), the contact of the senses with their objects (sannikara), consciousness 
produced by this contact (jnam), the contact of the self and mind (manas), and the 
contact of mind/intellect (manas) and the senses. 
On the Naiyāyika’s account of perception, all other conditions may be satisfied, but 
if the self is not present, perception would be impossible. The self controls the senses, 
synthesises their function, and confers a unity amongst the epistemic instruments. 
Consciousness is an integral property of the self. The self is the substratum of 
consciousness that does not need to be conscious always. Consciousness cannot exist 
apart from the self, even as light cannot exist apart from a flame. Consciousness 
is a quality of the self, produced in the waking state by the conjunction of the self 
with the mind (manas). Mind (manas) is seen as only the instrument by which the 
self thinks. Manas is atomic in size whereas the self is infinite. Mind, according to 
the Naiyyikas, does not have the ability to perceive; it is not a substance or the 
perceiver but rather a quality of the self that alone has the ability to perceive. Self 
is the perceiver of all things (sarvasya draṭ), the experiencer of all (bhokt), and 
the knower of all things (sarvnubhv) (Radhakrishnan 1998, 147–48). The Nyya-
stra of Gautama (2.21) therefore rules out the possibility of perception without 
tman: ‘Perception cannot arise unless there is conjunction of tma with mind’ 
(Agrawal 2001, 16). 
If Siderits’ claim is right, we have to attribute to Candrakrti the Nyya’s metaphysics 
of self, without which there would be no Nyāya epistemology, since the self is the 
backbone unifying all other epistemic instruments and the one that affords them 
cognitive life. In my view, attributing such a view to Candrakīrti is to totally defeat 
the whole purpose behind both Candrakīrti’s and Nāgārjuna’s painstaking critique of 
the foundationalist epistemologies of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. 
Prāsaṅgika’s theory of perception
We therefore need to look for an alternative solution to the problem, and this is 
precisely the aim of my paper. The paper explores Candrakīrti’s own account 
  99C A N D R A K Ī R T I ’ S  T H E O R Y  O F  P E R C E P T I O N
of perception, which he defends in the CŚT and PP, although, shall we say, 
somewhat unsystematically. There exists, however, Candrakīrti’s little known work, 
Pacaskandhaprakaraṇa (PSP Dbu ma ya 239b–266b), which provides us a more 
systematic outline supporting his theory of knowledge and perception. This text 
provides us a brief but useful discussion concerning Candrakīrti’s treatment of 
the nature of sensory perceptions. Although his discussion is specifically on the 
epistemic issues surrounding the visual perceptual process—including the faculty of 
vision, visual consciousness, and form—it is clear from the text that the underlying 
principles can be applied to the epistemic practice of sensory perceptions. 
I claim that Candrakīrti’s theory of perception is a radical departure from the 
Pramāṇika’s account. It is almost a complete reverse of the latter. As far as Candrakīrti 
is concerned: 
(1) Reliable cognition only makes sense with regards to the perceptibles 
(pratyaka) that are non-intrinsic (niḥsvabhāva) and dependently arisen, 
because everything is causally dependent. This rules out the possibility of 
the so-called reliable cognition (pramṇa) of intrinsic reality (svabhva) or 
unique particulars (svalakaṇa) of the Pramāṇika.
(2) Perception can be nondeceptive about the perceptibles that constitute 
conventional reality and therefore can be defined as reliable cognition within 
the mundane context. But perception can never be regarded as non-deceptive 
(hence reliable cognition) with respect to the unique particulars (svalakaṇa), 
since all perceptibles lack the so-called unique particularity. 
(3) The majority of perceptual cognitions, excluding the cognitive processes 
of noble beings in their meditative equipoise, are conceptual cognitive 
processes, and yet they may still be reliable cognitions since such cognitions 
could still satisfy the mundane epistemic standard. 
(4) Perception is defined as non-deceptive within the context of mundane 
epistemic practice. But it is not defined as invariably non-erroneous or 
incontrovertible (abhrnta / mi khrul ba) as the Pramāṇika does. If the 
Pramāṇika’s definition were true, then perception would be intrinsically non-
erroneous irrespective of any other considerations regarding the epistemic 
instruments. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend all these claims systematically. My 
attempt here in the remaining sections of the paper is to produce the Prāsaṅgika’s 
defence for some aspects of these claims. I intend do this by drawing on Candrakīrti’s 
arguments concerning the four central theses in his theory of perception:
(1) Perceptual reliability (pramāṇa) is not an intrinsic (svabhāva) or unique 
(svalakṣaṇa) characteristic of the perceptions, 
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(2)  Perceptual reliability is determined by the perceptibles,
(3)  Perception is limited in what it comprehends,
(4)  Perceptual reliability can be associated with conceptuality, or that a conceptual 
cognition can be epistemically reliable. 
The arguments presented to defend these theses, in my view, constitute the heart 
of Candrakīrti’s distinctive theory of perception. So the primary task I propose to 
undertake in this paper is to analyse these four theses in turn and analyse the 
ways in which Candrakīrti’s works provide us both the textual support and the 
philosophical arguments to set up the frameworks for his non-foundationalist 
theory of perception. 
Perception redefined
We begin with the Prāsaṅgika’s definition of perception. Candrakīrti defines reliable 
cognition (pramāṇa) in the Catuḥśatakatıkā (CŚT) as simply ‘non-deceptive 
consciousness in the world’ (Dbu ma ya 197b).11 The definition employs two key 
terms: (1) non-deceptive consciousness and (2) world. The former sets the standard 
criterion of reliable cognition. By ‘reliable cognition’ (pramāṇa), Candrakīrti means 
consciousness that is non-deceptive in the epistemic sense within a defined set of 
contexts. The use of the latter term, ‘world’, therefore provides the context predicating 
that the non-deceptive character of cognition is to be understood strictly within the 
epistemic bounds of the world or in the confines of the worldly convention. The term 
‘world’ for Candrakīrti, as I have argued eleswhere (Thakchoe 2011, 41–3), is taken 
for granted by means of naïve common sense agreement. 
Candrakīrti’s use of the phrase ‘world’ (lokiya) in his definition of perception 
serves two important mutually entailing purposes: (1) it shows that the term non-
deceptive in Candrakīrti’s definition is an exclusive epistemic characterisation of the 
cognition in the uncritical mundane context; and therefore (2) it excludes the sense of 
non-deceptiveness discussed in the Madhyamaka’s ontology, which asserts the thesis 
that everything—cognitions and objects—are deceptive and empty of any intrinsic 
reality. In the CŚT XIII.301, Candrakīrti therefore writes as follows:
(1) The world regards non-deceptive (mi bslu ba) consciousness as being reliable cognition 
(pramāṇa). (2) Then the Transcendental Victor said that consciousness too, since it is 
a conditioned phenomenon (‘dus byas), is unreal, deceptive and illusory. That which is 
unreal, deceptive and illusory cannot be non-deceptive because while such an entity exists 
in one way it appears in another. Thus it makes no sense to say that such a phenomenon is 
11 Mi bslu ba’i shes pa ni ‘jig rten na tshad ma nyid du mthong na //. All the citations from the 
classical Tibetan Bstan ‘gyur in this work cited are from Sde dge edition of Tibetan Bstan ‘gyur. 
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a correct cognition; otherwise it would follow absurdly that all consciousnesses are correct 
cognitions (Dbu ma ya 197b; Candrakīrti 1996, 334).12
From the Pramāṇika’s foundationalist perspective, this passage makes two 
contradictory claims: (1) non-deceptive (mi bslu ba) consciousness is reliable 
cognition (pramāṇa), but (2) there is no such thing as non-deceptive consciousness 
(and therefore there is no reliable cognition) since all consciousnesses are unreal, 
deceptive, and illusory. Candrakīrti argues that this contradiction is unavoidable in 
the Pramāṇika’s theory of perception since it characterises non-deceptivity as the 
intrinsic nature of perception. 
If this passage is viewed in the light of the context I have proposed, the two claims 
are not contradictory. When one reads the passage with the non-foundationalist lens 
of Candrakīrti, the two points he makes are rather complementary—the former is 
dependent on the latter. That is to say, for Candrakīrti, non-deceptive (mi bslu ba) 
consciousness is epistemically effective and reliable cognition (pramāṇa) by the 
mundane standard because it is ontologically deceptive since it is empty of any 
intrinsic reality. To put it differently, even though all consciousnesses are, according 
to Candrakīrti’s ontology, unreal, deceptive and illusory-like, they are nevertheless 
efficient as reliable epistemic warrants. 
So, what Candrakīrti proposes in the passage (the former claim) is the possibility of 
a mundane epistemic warrant without the need for any intrinsically real consciousness, 
and therefore what he denies (the latter claim) is precisely the possibility of epistemic 
warrant of intrinsically real consciousness. To put the point differently, Candrakīrti 
wants to propose the efficacy of the perceptual theory based on the non-foundational 
and dependently arisen ontology of consciousness, while rejecting the efficacy of 
foundational and intrinsically real consciousness. 
Advancing his dependence argument in the CŚT XI.268, Candrakīrti says that 
‘[t]he eyes, etc. are six sense faculties. Form, etc., as they really are conventionally, 
constitute their six objects. Also due to the power of the faculties of sense and their 
objects, there arise these sixfold consciousnesses’ (Dbu ma ya 180a; Candrakrti 1996, 
299).13 What Candrakīrti means is this: we have six sensory perceptions derived from 
six types of consciousnesses (vijānam), all of which arise dependently: (1) visual 
12 Mi bslu ba’i shes pa ni ‘jig rten na tshad ma nyid du mthong na / rnam par shes pa yang bcom 
ldan ldas kyis ‘dus byas yin pa’i phyir brdzun pa bslu pa’i chos can dang sgyu ma lta bur gsungs so // 
gang zhig brdzun pa bslu ba’i chos can dang sgyu ma lta bu yin pa de ni mi bslu ba ma yin te / rnam 
pa gzhan du gnas pa’i dngos po la rnam pa gzhan du snang pa’i phyir ro / de lta bur gyur pa ni tshad 
ma nyid du brtag par rigs pa ma yin te / rnam par shes pa thams cad kyang tshad ma nyid du thal par 
‘gyur pa’i phyir ro //. Cf. also Tillemans 1990, 179, §16.
13 ‘di na mig la sogs pa rnams ni dbang po drug yin la gzugs la sogs pa rnams ni bdag nyid ji lta 
ba bzhin de rnams kyang yul drug yin zhing, dbang po dang don gyi dbang gis kyang rnam par shes 
pa’i tshogs drug tu ‘gyur ro //.
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consciousness (cakṣur vijānam) dependently arises from the faculty of visual sense 
(cakṣuindriya) and visible objects (rūpāyatanam), (2) auditory consciousness (śrotra 
vijānam) dependently arises from the faculty of auditory sense (śrotrendriya) and 
sound (śabdāyatanam), (3) olfactory consciousness (ghrāṇa vijānam) dependently 
arises from the faculty of olfactory sense (ghrāṇendriya) and smell (gandhāyatanam), 
(4) gustatory consciousness (jihvā vijānam) dependently arises from the faculty 
of gustatory sense (jihvendriya) and tastes (rasāyatanam), (5) tactual consciousness 
(kāya vijānam) dependently arises from the faculty of tactual sense (kāyendriya) 
and tangibles (spraṣṭavyāyatanam), and (6) mental consciousness (mano vijānam)14 
dependently arises from the faculty of mental sense (manendriya) and thoughts or 
ideas (dharmāyatanam). 
Candrakīrti’s contention is this: since there are only six types of sensory 
consciousnesses and only six kinds of sensory perceptions, they are only six faculties of 
sense and six corresponding sensory objects. This must follow because the production 
of each perception depends on the production of the respective consciousness, and 
the cessation of each perception is dependent on the cessation of the respective 
consciousness. Likewise the production of each consciousness is dependent on the 
existence of its respective sensory faculty and its objects; and the cessation of each 
sensory consciousness is dependent on the cessation of the respective sensory faculty 
and its object. ‘Therefore, in this context’, Candrakīrti explains, ‘It is well-known 
amongst all our systems that every consciousness is produced dependently, and they 
cease after every moment [i.e., they do not endure for two moments]’ (Dbu ma ya 
180a; Candrakrti 1996, 299–300).15
In the Pacaskandhaprakaraṇa (PSP), Candrakīrti further bolsters his dependency 
argument by demonstrating the need of having two supporting conditions for the 
consciousness. When the opponents asks, ‘What is the faculty of visual sense?’ 
Candrakīrti replies: ‘[The Prakaraṇa] states that it is a translucent16 form that supports 
14 Reliable mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) is the second type of perception. Based on 
Candrakīrti’s revised definition of reliable perception, ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje defines reliable 
mental perception as ‘non-deceptive cognition of the perceptible (pratyakṣa) as its apprehended 
object—directly by the medium of the physical sense faculty as its dominant condition’ (‘Jam 
dbyang Bzhad pa’i Ddo rje 2006, 423). Dge shes Blo bzang Rgya mtsho also defines it as a ‘cognition 
that is directly and experientially aware of its object by the means of its unique dominant condition, 
i.e., a faculty of physical sense’ (Dge shes Blo bzang Rgya mtsho 2002, 190).
15 De’i phyir ‘dir rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba gang yin pa de thams cad ni rten cing ‘brel par 
‘byung ba dang skad cig mar ‘jig go zhes bya bar rang gi sde pa rnams la grags pa yin no … de’i tse 
‘thad pa dang ‘gal ba’i bya ba mi srid pa’i phyir mig la sogs pa rnams kyi rang gi ngo bo rtog pa ga la 
yod / ‘byung ba las gyur pa nyid du mtshungs bzhin du yul ‘dzin pa tha dad pa brtag par ni mi rigs so 
// [201b] mig la sogs pa rnams kyi yod pa nyid ni yul ‘dzin pa las rjes su dpog pa yin na de yang ‘gal 
bas mi srid de de’i phyir dbang po yod pas yul rnams mngon sum nyid du mi rigs so //.
16 Candrakīrti characterises the faculty of visual sense as a transparent material form that provides 
cognitive support for the rise of visual consciousness. It is not however the case that this faculty of 
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(āśraya / rten) visual consciousness. The support for visual consciousness is twofold: 
the faculty of visual sense, which arises simultaneously [with visual consciousness 
itself], and the antecedent mental [consciousness]... In just the same manner, one 
needs to understand the faculty of auditory sense, etc.’ (PSP Dbu ma ya 240b–241a).17 
The point made here is that sensory consciousness arises from two cognitive 
supports because (1) it co-arises and co-exists with a sensory faculty, and (2) it arises 
from the cessation of the antecedent mental consciousness. In the case of visual 
consciousness, for instance, the two cognitive supports are the faculty of visual sense, 
which co-arises and co-exists with visual consciousness itself, and the cessation of 
the antecedent mental consciousness. 
Therefore in the PSP Candrakīrti defines the epistemic functions of each 
consciousness as follows: ‘Visual consciousness is a specific cognition of forms 
dependent on the faculty of visual sense. … Auditory consciousness is a specific 
cognition of sounds dependent on the faculty of auditory sense. … Olafactory 
consciousness is a specific cognition of smell dependent on the faculty of olafactory 
sense. … Tactual consciousness is a specific cognition of tacticle objects dependent 
on the faculty of tactual sense. … Mental consciousness is a specific cognition of 
phenomena [i.e., mental contents] dependent on the faculty of mental sense’ (PSP 
Dbu ma ya 266a).18
visual sense ‘exists in the eyeball and resembles the size of a grape seed or a zera flower. Rather it 
exists in between or is covered beneath a transparent membrane. This is so’, says Candrakīrti, ‘since 
it is [inferentially] cognised from its effect—i.e., visual consciousness’ (PSP Dbu ma ya 240b: Mig 
gi dbang po ‘di ni mig gi rten gyi mig gi ‘bras bu’i nang na rgun ‘bru’i ‘bras bu’i tshad tsam zi ra’i me 
tog lta bu ltar med pa pags pa dang bas gyogs pa dang bar gnas pa rang gi ‘bras bu rnam par shes 
pa las rtogs pa ste … ). That is, the existence of the transparent faculty of visual sense is, at least for 
an ordinary being, not a domain of direct perception, but rather a domain of an inference since it 
needs to be inferred from its effect, namely the visual consciousness. ‘For this reason, although blind 
people with eyeballs appear to possess the cognitive support of the faculty of visual sense, we can 
understand that the sensory faculty is absent in them from the fact that visual consciousness does not 
arise in them’ (PSP Dbu ma ya 240b: De yang ‘di ltar ce re long rnams kyi mig gi rten ‘dra bar gnas 
kyang rnam par shes pa mi ‘byung bas dbang po med par rab tu shes so //). Bhāvavevika says that 
he adopts the Ābhidharmic theory of the sensory faculty being a transparent material form on the 
conventional level but argues that the sensory faculty is not ultimately a transparent material form 
for the reason that it is causally produced. See Tarkajvālā III.43, Dbu ma dza 67a: chos mngon pa las 
mig gi dbang po ni go snyod kyi me tog lta bu ‘am zhog chu lta bu yul kha dog gzugs dang ba’o zhes 
de’i mtshan nyid bstan pa de ni kho bo cag kyang kun rdzob tu ‘dod do // don dam par ni mig gi dbang 
po yul gyi kha dog gzugs dang ba ma yin te / byas pa nyid kyi phyir ro zhes bya ba la sogs pa’i gtan 
tsigs dag gis dpe yang pags pa dag la sogs pa bzhin no //.
17 Mig gi dbang po gang zhe na / mig gi rnam par shes pa’i rten gzugs [241a] // dang po’i zhes 
‘byung ngo // mig gi rnam par shes pa ‘di’i rten ni rnam pa gnyis te / lhan cig skyes pa’i mig dang ‘das 
pa’i yid do // de la mig la mig gi rnam par shes pa’i rten du brjod na yid kyis kyang mi gces bya ba 
‘thob par ‘gyur bas / de bas na gzugs dang ba zhes smos so // de bzhin du rna ba la sogs pa la yang 
shes par bya’o//.
18 Mig gi rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / mig gi dbang po la brten nas gzugs so sor rnam par rig 
pa’o // rna ba’i rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / rna ba’i dbang po la brten nas sgra so sor rnam par 
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Based on Candrakīrti’s definition, ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje reconstructs the 
definition of reliable sensory perception, as ‘a cognition that directly by the medium 
of the faculty of physical sense as its dominant condition (adhipati pratyaya) is non-
deceptive with regard to the perceptible (pratyakṣa) as its apprehended object’ (‘Jam 
dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje 2006, 423).19 Dge shes Blo bzang Rgya mtsho concurs 
and defines it as ‘[a]n awareness that by the means of the faculty of physical sense as 
its unique dominant condition is directly and experientially aware of its object’ (Dge 
shes Blo bzang Rgya mtsho 2002, 190).20 Applying this generic definition of reliable 
sensory perception, a reliable visual sensory perception, for instance, could be defined 
as a cognition that directly by means of the faculty of visual sense as its dominant 
condition is non-deceptive with regards to its apprehended object: forms, colour, etc. 
Likewise the same definition is applied to define other reliable perceptions. 
On close observation, the Prāsaṅgika’s definition of sensory perception stresses 
the sensory faculties as the specific or dominant condition (adhipati pratyaya) unique 
to the operational process of each individual sensory perception. The dominant or 
specific condition (adhipati pratyaya) that provides, according to the Prāsaṅgika, 
necessary epistemic differentiations or individuations between the three classes of 
perceptions (sensory, mental and yogic) or between individual perceptions within 
the same class. For instance the contrasts between visual sensory perception vis-à-
vis auditory sensory perception (although both instances of sensory perceptions) can 
be explained through the differences between the faculty of visual sense and faculty 
of auditory sense as the dominant condition. The one that has visual sense as its 
dominant condition is the visual sense perception, while the one with auditory sense 
as its dominant condition is the auditory sense perception. 
The Ābhidharmikas and the Logicians claim that the eyes and other sensory 
faculties are intrinsically existent because we observe them from their effects—the 
sensory consciousnesses. In the CŚT XIII.312, Āryadeva rejects the possibility of 
proving the intrinsic existence of sensory faculties through consciousness on three 
counts: [1] ‘Because the conditions (pratyaya / rkyen) would be incomplete, the 
consciousness could not exist before the sight. [2] But after [sight], the consciousness 
would be pointless. In the third case [viz. simultaneously], the instrument (karaṇa / 
rig pa’o // sna’i rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / sna’i dbang po la brten nas dri so sor rnam par rig 
pa’o // lce’i rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / lce’i dbang po la brten nas ro so sor rnam par rig pa’o // 
lus kyi rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / lus kyi dbang po la brten nas reg bya so sor rnam par rig pa’o 
// yid kyi rnam par shes pa gang zhe na / yid kyi dbang po la brten nas chos so sor rnam par rig pa’o 
//.
19 Rang gi bdag rkyen bdang po gzugs can la dgnos su brten cing rang gi ‘dzin stangs kyi yul 
mngon sum pa la mi slu ba’i shes pa / dbang po’i mngon sum tshad ma’i mtshad nyid /.
20 Blo gang zhig rang gi thun min gyi bdag rkyen dbang po gsugs can pa la brten nas rang yul 
myong stobs kyis rig pa / dbang po’i mngon sum gyi mtshan nyi /.
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byed pa) would be pointless’ (Dbu ma ya 202a; 1996, 343).21 Elaborating on Āryadeva’s 
critique of the foundationalist position, Candrakīrti in the CŚT XIII.312 points out 
that the existence of consciousness itself remains unproven for the foundationalist 
on three grounds. 
First, visual consciousness does not exist before the existence of the faculty 
of visual sense, since eyesight, perception, would lack its dominant condition 
(adhipatipratyaya / bdag po’i rkyen) even though the other three conditions—the 
causal condition (hetupratyaya), the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), and the 
immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya)—are present (Dbu ma ya 
202a; Candrakrti 1996, 343).22 
Second, if visual consciousness existed after the cessation of the faculty of visual 
sense, then the consciousness would be pointless. If the eye could see the visual form 
without  there being visual consciousness, then there would be no point in assuming 
the reality of visual consciousness (Dbu ma ya 202a; Candrakrti 1996, 343).23
Third, if the visual faculty and visual consciousness are conceived as occurring 
simultaneously, it would be pointless to posit the faculty of visual sense as one of 
the instruments (karaṇa / byed pa) or conditions for the production of sight or visual 
consciousness. If they both existed simultaneously, they would be independent from 
each other. The visual consciousness that exists at the same time as the faculty of 
visual sense and is dependent upon the visual faculty could then not arise, just as 
the right and the left horns of an ox exist concurrently and independently from each 
other, and therefore they could not come into being if they were dependent on each 
other (Dbu ma ya 202ab; Candrakrti 1996, 343–45).24
Pratyakṣa as perceptibles
Candrakīrti’s second thesis is the claim that perceptual reliability is determined by the 
perceptibles. This is in direct constrast to the Pramāṇika’s claim that epistemic authority 
21 Rkyen ma tsang phyir shes pa ni // lta ba’i snga rol yod ma yin // ‘on te phyis na shes don med 
// gsum par byed pa don med ‘gyur //.
22 Re zhig lta ba’i snga rol du ni mig gi rnam par shes pa yod pa ma yin no // mig gi lta ba bdag 
po’i rkyen ma tshang ba’i phyir ro //.
23 Ci ste lta ba’i ‘og rol du rtog na ni de’i tshe shes pa don med de / gal te rnam par shes pa med 
pa’i mig gis gzugs mthong na ni ‘o na rnam par shes pa yongs su rtog pa don med do //.
24 Gsum par byed pa don med ‘gyur te rtog pa gsum pa ni lta ba dang shes pa gnyis cig car ‘byung 
ba ste / de la rgyu [202b] don med do // ‘di lta bas na lta ba ste byed pa de don med par ‘gyur ro // lta 
ba dang shes pa gnyis cig car yod na ni rnam par shes pa gang zhig lta ba dang dus mtshungs pa de 
lta ba la rag las te ‘byung bar mi rigs so // ba lang gi rva gyas gyon lhan cig ‘byung ba dag la ni cig 
shos la rag las te skye ba nyid mi srid de / de bzhin du lta ba dang lhan cig ‘byung ba’i rnam par shes 
pa lta ba la rag las te skye ba nyid du mi ‘gyur bas lta ba don med pa kho nar ‘gyur ro // ci ste sgron 
ma dang ‘od bzhin du dus mnyam pa dag yin yang lta ba la rag las te gnas pa nyid du ‘gyur ro snyam 
du sems na / de yang yod pa ma yin te / der yang brgal zhing brtag pa mtshungs pa’i phyir ro //.
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is an intrinsic (svabhāva) or unique characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of perception 
because it is intrinsically non-deceptive and nonconceptual. For Candrakīrti to 
claim that perception is non-deceptive is to claim however that the cognition in 
question is epistemically reliable with respect to its principle perceptible object. 
In other words, the nondeceptivity of the cognition is not an intrinsic nature of the 
cognition itself. 
To this effect, Candrakīrti proposes a different semantic valuation for the term 
pratyakṣa. The Sanskrit term pratyakṣa (mngon sum) and the meanings associated 
with it are at the centre of the argument. The term pratyakṣa, commonly rendered into 
English as ‘perception’, justaposed against ‘perceptible’, is not so straighforward as 
the term perception in English suggests. By definition, perception in English always 
refers to a type of cognition—the ability to see, hear, or become aware of things 
through the senses as derived from Latin perceptio(n), from the verb percipere, 
meaning ‘sieze’, ‘understand’. It does not have the sense of perceptible objects, 
explicitly or otherwise. 
The term pratyakṣa however is ambiguous.25 It has these senses: (1) ‘perceptible’ 
as an object and (2) ‘perception’ as a subject or cognition, and as Candrakīrti 
comments on it in the PP I.3, ‘whether it is the subject of a characterisation (lakṣya) 
or a unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) or a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa)—if it exists in 
the world’, according to Candrakīrti, ‘it must be evident (aparokṣa) because it must 
always (sarvam eva) be an object of a direct perception. For that reason, along with 
its subject, which is the cognition apprehending it, a perceptible is also posited as 
pratyakṣa’ (Candrakīrti 1960, 25).26
At the crux of this ambiguity is Candrakīrti’s adjectival sense of pratyakṣa, 
‘perceptible’, which is so central to his account of perception. It is this perceptibility 
of visible objects that drives home, Candrakīrti argues, the usage of the term that also 
denotes ‘the cognition that has a perceptible object’ (tadviṣayaṇa jānena saha). This 
being the case, the definition of reliable perceptual cognition for Candrakīrti is not 
one that privileges perception with an intrinsic epistemic authority. This is precisely 
the case in the Pramāṇika’s account of perception since it defines it as intrinsically 
non-deceptive (pramāṇa) on the grounds of it being devoid of any conceptuality 
(kalpanāpoḍha). 
25 As we shall shortly see, this ambiguity is critical in the debate between the Buddhist 
foundationalist vis-à-vis the antifounationalist Prāsaṅgika.
26 Tasmāl loke yadi lakṣyam / yadi vā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā / sarvam eva sākṣad 
upalabhyamānatvād aparokṣaṃ ata pratyakṣaṃ vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayeṇa saha //. (Dbu ma ‘a 25b: 
De’i phyir gal te mtshan gzhi ‘am rang gi mtshan nyid dam spyi’i mtshan nyid kyang rung ste / ‘jig rten 
na yod na ni thams cad mngon sum du dmigs par bya ba yin pa’i phyir na lkog tu ma gyur pa yin te / 
de’i phyir de’i yul can gyi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig tu mngon sum nyid du rnam par gzhag go //.)
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For Candrakīrti, perceptibles, both directly visible objects and conceptual 
abstractions or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇas), determine the defining criterion of 
reliable perceptual cognition (cf. Arnold 2005, 461). Candrakīrti makes this point 
explicit in the PP I.3, stating 
Perceptible is an object that draws towards it the faculties of sense; hence the word 
pratyakṣa expresses the meaning evident (aparokṣa). From the statement ‘an object that 
draws towards it the faculties of sense’, visible objects like jars and colours and so forth are 
affirmed as perceptibles. A cognition that ascertains these [jars, colours, etc.] is designated 
as being a perception because the perceptible [objects] like straw or chaff-fire causes it. 
(Candrakīrti 1960, 24)27
Therefore perception is only a provisional pratyakṣa, whereas perceptible is a 
pratyakṣa proper.28 It is perceptible objects that cause perceptual cognition to arise, 
since it arises when the perceptible objects draw towards them perceptual cognition 
even as the presence of chaff-fire causes the perceptual cognition that ascertains it to 
arise. Moreover, in PP I.3 we read: 
The word pratyakṣa [as being perceptible] is indeed well-known in the world. Whatever it 
is in the world is precisely what we explain [not by you Pramāṇika]. But if your account 
[of pratyakṣa] undermines the ordinary categories as they are established, then it would 
undermine the very expression ‘well-known’ (prasiddhaabda). Therefore [your account 
of pratyakṣa] would not be what is [commonly] called pratyakṣa’. (Candrakrti 1960, 25)29 
Pratyakṣa as the perceptible is a well-known fact of ordinary discourse, and for 
a thing to be ‘perceptible’ is for that thing to be directly accessible to our ordinary 
senses as opposed to being a thing that is directly inaccessible. The Pramāṇika’s 
theory of perception, which does not recognise pratyakṣa as perceptibles, therefore 
contradicts the mundane convention. 
27 Aparoṣa artha vācita vāta pratyakṣa abdasya sāṣāda bhimukho artha pratyakaṣa / prati-
gatam ṣamsminniti kṛatvā ghata nīlādīnām paroṣāṇāṁ pratyakṣatvaṁ sidhdaṁ bhavati / tatparic-
chedakasya jñānasya tṛuṇa tuṣānīgavat pratyakṣa kāraṇatvāt pratyakṣatvaṁ vyapadiayati /; (Dbu ma 
‘a 24b; Candrakrti 2003, 53): Mngon sum gyi sgra ni lkog tu ma gyur pa’i don gyi rjod par byed pa 
yin pa’i phyir / dbang po mngon du phyogs pa’i don ni mngon sum yin no // ‘di la dbang po mngon du 
phyogs pas zhes bya ba nas bum pa dang sngon po la sogs pa lkog tu ma gyur pa rnams mngon sum 
nyid du grub par ‘gyur la / de yongs su gcod par byed pa’i shes pa ni rtzva dang sog ma’i me bzhin du 
mngon sum gyi rgyu can yin pa’i phyir mngon sum nyid du rjod par byed do //.
28 This claim of Candrakīrti is radically different from the position held by all other Buddhist 
schools, which unanimously admit perception as the proper pratyakṣa and perceptible being the pseudo.
29 Loke pratyakṣa abdasya prasiddatvādvivaṣite arthe pratyarthe abdasya prasidda 
vādāṛayeṇiava vyutpatti rāṛīyata iti ceta, ucayate / astyayayaṁ pratyakṣa abdo loke prasidda / sa 
tu yathā loke, tathā asmābhirūcyata eva yathāsthita laokika padārtha tirasakāreṇa tu tadvayutapāde 
kṛiyamaṇe prasidda abda tiraskāra prasiddh syāta, tataca pratyakṣamitya evaṃ na syāta /. Dbu 
ma ‘a 25a: Mngon sum gyi sgra ‘di ‘jig rten la grags pa ni yod mod kyi / de ji ltar ‘jig rten na yin pa de 
ltar ni kho bo cag gis smras pa nyid do // ‘jig rten pa’i don ji ltar gnas pa spangs nas de bye brag tu 
‘chad par byed na ni / rab tu grags pa’i sgra yang spong bar ‘gyur ro // de’i phyir mngon sum zhes bya 
ba de ltar mi ‘gyur ro //.
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Candrakīrti applies the same principle even in his theory of perceptual error, 
according to which even the intentional objects of so-called perceptual errors are 
regarded as perceptibles and therefore pratyakṣa proper. This is for two reasons: 
(1) perceptual errors arise because of the representations of illusory objects such 
as double moons, and therefore (2) the intentional objects with which the erroneous 
perceptual cognitions are engaged do have the epistemic quality of being perceptible 
from the perspective of such cognitions. In the PP I.3, he writes: 
Double moons, etc., although they do not have the quality of being perceptible from the 
point view of the cognition without cataracts [i.e. normal cognitions], these objects indeed 
have the quality of being perceptible from the point of view of the cognition with cataracts, 
etc. (Candrakrti 1960, 25)30
Here Candrakīrti is not defending the epistemic authority of the defective 
perception per se without qualifying his statement. He is defending the claim that 
even defective perceptions are reliable in so far as they correctly perceive the 
intentional objects that appear to them, even though those objects really do not exist. 
This might sound implausible since it seems to contradict the mundane epistemic 
convention. Candrakīrti however insists that is not the case. ‘In this tradition, 
although the appearance of the double moons, the appearance of the falling hairs, 
and so forth are accepted as the perceptibles, this does not however contradict the 
mundane convention. This is because’, as ‘Jamyang bzhad pa explains it, ‘there is 
no difference between [the mundane convention and the Prāsaṅgika’s position] in 
terms of accepting what does and does not constitute the perceptibility (pratyakṣa), 
depending on whether or not the worldly sensory cognitions are with or without 
cataracts’ (‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje 2006, 422).31 
This follows, says ‘Jamyang bzhad pa, on two grounds. (1) From the point of view 
of the cognition without the cataracts (i.e., mundane convention), the double moons, 
the falling hairs, etc., are not perceptibles, since these objects are neither directly 
perceived nor ascertained by normal cognitions. The cognitions apprehending the 
double moon, etc. are thus unreliable cognitions (apramāṇa) from the vantage point 
of the cognition without cataracts. (2) From the point of view of perceptual cognition 
with cataracts, however, the double moon, etc. are perceptibles. For there are such 
cognitions with cataracts, etc. that directly perceive and ascertain such objects. The 
30 Dvi candrādīnaṁ tu ataimirika jānāpeṣya apratyakṣatvaṁ, taimirikādhyapeṣaya tu 
pratyakṣatvaṁ eva //. Dbu ma ‘a 25b: Zla ba gnyis la sogs pa dag ni rab rib can ma yin pa’i shes pa la 
ltos nas mngon sum nyid ma yin la / rab rib can la sogs pa la ltos nas ni mngon sum nyid kho na’o //.
31 Des na lugs ‘dir zla gnyis kyi snang ba dang nam mkha’i skra shad ‘dzag snang sogs kyang ‘di 
bas mngon sum par ‘dod kyang ‘jig rten pa dang mi ‘gal te / ‘jig rten pa’i dbang shes rab rib sogs med 
pa dang yod pa las mngon sum min pa dang yin par ‘dod pa la khyad par med pa’i phyir //.
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cognition apprehending the double moon, etc. is thus a reliable cognition (pramāṇa) 
with respect to the perceptibles such as the double moons (ibid.).32
Therefore for Candrakīrti, says ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa, ‘any dualistic 
cognition must necessarily be a reliable perceptual cognition with reference to the 
representational object that appears to it (snang yul)’ (ibid., 421).33 That is to say that 
from the point of view of the mundane convention, and also from the point of view of 
the co-dependence of the subject and the object, perceptible is the actual pratyakṣa, 
whereas perception is the provisional pratyakṣa (ibid.).34 
At this point the opponent of the Prāsaṅgika could raise two possible objections. 
First, they could object that a defective cognition could not be a reliable perceptual 
cognition on the grounds that its epistemic validity is undermined and contradicted by 
the worldly convention in which non-deceptive perceptions alone meet the standard 
of epistemical warrant. 
The Prāsaṅgika replies to this by saying that there is no pervasion or necessary 
entailment in the opponent’s argument. That is, even though the mundane convention 
undermines the epistemic status of the defective sensory cognition, it does not 
necessary follow that all defective epistemic states have no valid explanation of their 
own. Although the objects represented in such cognitions may not be real by the 
conventional standard, (and therefore they are regarded as utterly illusory, purely 
fictional), they nevertheless give rise to a conventionally real perceptual cognition. 
Fictional objects such as the double moons and falling hairs are unreal objects, but 
the fact remains that these fictional objects serve as the intentional objects of so-
called defective perceptual cognitions, and these cognitions do conventionally exist, 
although the objects represented in these cognitions may not even be conventionally 
real. The intentional objects, i.e. the representational objects that appear to these 
erroneous cognitions, according to the Prāsaṅgika, give rise to the existence of 
these fallacious perceptions; hence it insists that defective perceptions are reliable 
perceptual cognitions in relation to their perceptibles. Therefore, for a Prāsaṅgika, 
a defective sensory cognition is nevertheless a conventionally real epistemic state, 
although the object it represents is not.
The opponent may raise another objection: Does this mean that the visual 
perception that apprehends a ‘white cone shell as yellow’ is also a reliable visual 
32 De dang po la ltos nas mngon sum du mi snang bas mngon sum min pa des de la nges shes kyang 
‘dren mi thub pas tshad ma yang ma yin pa’i phyir dang // gnyis pa la ltos nas mngon sum du snang 
bas mngon sum yang yin / de yod pa la tshad ma gzhan la ma ltos par nges shes ‘dren pas tshad ma 
yang yin pa’i phyir ro //.
33 ‘des ni gnyis snang can gyi shes pa yin na rang gi rang gi snang yul la mngon sum tshad ma yin 
pas khyab par bstan pa yin te /.
34 Lhag mas yul yul can can gnyis ltos ‘jog gis mngon sum dngos btags su bshad pa’i phyir /.
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perception since this perception also satisfies Candrakīrit’s definition of a reliable 
sense perception? The Prāsaṅgika, according to Dge shes Rgya mtsho, replies to this 
objection by stating that this erroneous perception is not a case of a reliable visual 
perception; rather it is a case of mental perception since it is only with respect to the 
mental perception that the representation of the cone shell appears yellow (Dge shes 
Blo bzang Rgya mtsho 2002, 190–91).
There are numerous other examples of such perceptions, which while they are 
mental perceptions, appear to be sense perceptions. A visual perception apprehending 
a form or colour, for instance, is a sensory perceptual cognition with respect to the 
form or colour in question. With respect to the representations of the form or colour 
that appears to the mind, it is a mental perception. However, a conceptual cognition 
apprehending a form is conceptual with respect to the form in question, whereas it 
is a mental perception with respect to the representational appearance of the form. 
According to Dge shes Rgyatso, this represents a distinctive presentation of 
the Prāsaṅgika’s perceptual theory. Even though there is one recognised cognitive 
event depending on various objects, sense faculties, and consciousnesses involved 
in the process, it is possible separately to account for, or differentiate between, the 
mental and perceptual cognitions involved in the same cognitive process, without 
undermining or contradicting each other’s operational or epistemic value (Dge shes 
Blo bzang Rgya mtsho 2002, 191).35 
Candrakīrti does not reject the efficacy of defective sensory perceptions, even 
though he knows that these cognitions do not satisfy the standard of mundane 
convention. This is because he defines them as epistemic warrants, not with respect 
to the mundane standard, but with respect to their intentional objects. 
A similar line of argument is used for the reason not to undermine epistemic 
authority in mundane practice, even though scrutiny of the analytic cognition could 
easily undermine such epistemic authority. For no subject and object, according to 
Candrakīrti, defies reasoned analysis. The perceptibles that are established as real 
by reliable mundane cognitions are found to be unreal when those perceptibles are 
subjected to critical rational analysis. Therefore Candrakīrti writes in the PP. 
Things like jars, colours of blue, etc. are not accepted as perceptible (pratyakṣa) from 
the standpoint of one who knows reality (tattvavidapekṣayā). Jars, etc. are accepted as 
perceptible exclusively according to the worldly convention. (Dbu ma ‘a 24a)36
35 Shes pa’i ngo bo gcig yin yang dbang po dang yul so so’i khyad par las mngon sum dang rtog 
pa so sor ‘jog pa mi ‘gal ba ni lugs ‘di’i thun mong ma yin pa ‘o //.
36 De kho na nyid gzigs pa la ltos nas ni bum pa la sogs pa dang sngon po la sogs pa rnams mngon 
sum nyid du mi ‘dod do // ‘jig rten gyi kun rdzob tu ni bum pa la sogs pa rnams mngon sum nyid du 
khas blang bar bya ba kho na’o //.
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As Āryadeva’s CŚT states:
When its colour is seen, the presence of the whole jar is not seen. But what knower of 
reality would say that a jar is [ultimately] perceptible? One supremely intelligent who 
is capable of this very same analysis appeases all of these—sweet fragrance, melodious 
sound, and softness. (Dbu ma ya 195ab, 198a)37
As we can see, Candrakīrti cites the first two verses in Āryadeva’s CŚT to corroborate 
his argument that when a Prāsaṅgika speaks of a perceptible jar and so forth, he is 
always speaking of it from a non-analytical conventional standpoint—the standpoint 
of ordinary mundane cognition, which he argues engages with its object uncritically. 
Hence only on this level of uncritical discourse does a Prāsaṅgika acknowledge a 
perceptible as conventionally real. This standpoint is contrasted in the above text 
with the critical analytical perspective of a ‘knower of reality’ (tattvavida), who 
comprehends that nothing is established as a perceptible when subjected to reasoned 
analysis. That is, from the analytic perspective, nothing is established as a perceptible, 
for everything is logically reducible, and therefore no perceptual cognition is said 
to arise ultimately. But this assertion does not undermine the conventional fact of 
perceptible things. Conventionally things do arise from their causes and conditions, 
and convention accepts things as they are conventionally without subjecting them 
to rigorous analytic tests. The analytic perspective therefore does not undermine the 
possibility of perceptual cognition arising conventionally. In the same way, Candrakīrti 
makes the point that the epistemic authority of cognition in mundane usage should 
not be exploited to undermine the epistemic efficacy of defective sensory cognitions. 
Perception and epistemic limits
In direct contrast to Candrakīrti’s position, which argues that it is the perceptibles 
that determine the efficacy of the perceptual process, the Pramāṇika argues that it 
is the intrinsic nature of the faculties of sense to function as the means by which we 
establish perceptible objects (pratyakṣa). Candrakīrti challenges this assertion and says 
if this were the case then it would be illogical for the Pramāṇika to attribute different 
cognitive functions to different faculties of sense in virtue of the different objects. 
37 Sarva eva ghaṭo ‘dṛṣṭo rūpe dṛṣṭe hi jāyate, brūyāt kas tattvavinnāma ghaṭa pratyakṣ ity api? 
Etenaive vicārenṇa sugandhi madhuraṃ mṛdu / pratiṣedhayitavyāni sarvāṇy uttamabuddhinā // (gzugs 
mthong tse na bum pa ni // thams cad kho na mthong mi ‘gyur // bum pa mngon sum zhes bya [195b] 
ba’ang // de nyid rig pa su zhig smra //13.1// rnam par dpyad pa ‘di nyid kyis // blo mchog ldan pas dri 
zhim dang // mngar dang ‘jam pa thams cad dag// so sor dgag par bya ba yin //13.2//. I agree with Dan 
Arnold (2005, 452) to the extent that ‘this quotation furthers Candrakīrti’s critique of pratyakṣa as a 
privileged pramāṇa’. This does not follow however that the arguments in these passages and the ones 
Candrakīrti develops in chapter 13 of the CŚT are arguments against pratyakṣa in general. These argu-
ments, I argue, specifically target Nyāya and Pramāṇika foundationalism. The goal of this refutation 
is therefore to pave the way for an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception. 
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After all, if the Pramāṇika was right, the presence of the objects, however 
different they may be, should not limit the ways in which the faculties function if their 
operations are intrinsic to themselves. As Āryadeva’s CŚT XIII.301 says, ‘The eye 
sees only the visual form but not odours and other things, because they are different 
objects’ (Dbu ma ya 196a; Candrakrti 1996, 331).38 Commenting on this in his CŚT 
XIII.310–11, Candrakīrti writes: 
If the sense faculties did have the [intrinsic] power to discriminate39 (pariccheda / yong su 
gcod pa) [objects], then they would have visual form and so forth as their objects, but they 
do not have this [intrinsic power to discriminate]. Why? Because the five [sense faculties] 
such as the eyes are (1) all derived from the elements (bhautika / ‘byung ‘gyur) and (2) their 
functions differ because of the different objects. Hence, the eyes, for instance, see only 
[visual] form but do not hear sound. The ears perceive sound strictly and do not see form. 
(Dbu ma ya 201ab; Candrakīrti 1996, 341–42)40 
Candrakīrti’s argument does not deny the existence of the faculties of sense and 
their mundane epistemic functions. The following discussion in the CŚT XIII.311 
makes this point clearer. The opponent objects, ‘If the eyes and so on thus cannot 
exist, then how do you establish that faculties of sense such as the eyes, etc. are 
the effects of actions (karma)?’ Candrakīrti replies, ‘Did we deny that they are the 
effects?’ Again the opponent objects, ‘By having negated the existence of the eyes, 
etc. have you not denied [that they are karmic effects]’? Candrakīrti replies: 
It is because our analysis is primarily concerned with searching for the intrinsic natures 
(svabhāva) of the objects. Here, in this context, we are negating the things that are established 
by their intrinsic natures (svabhāva / rang gi ngo bo). We do not negate the eyes and so forth, 
which arise owing to the karmic effects of causal production and dependent co-arising. 
Thus, the eyes and the like do indeed exist, for we say that they are effects of karmic actions. 
(Dbu ma ya 201ab; Candrakīrti 1996, 342)41
38 Mig gis ni gzugs gcig pu mthong gi dri la sogs pa dag ni ma yin te yul tha dad pa’i phyir ro //.
39 Here Candrakīrti is refuting his Buddhist foundationalist opponent who claims the reality of 
the faculties of sense on the grounds that they have an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) to apprehend their 
objects. The claim goes in the CŚT as follows: ‘Perceptible things (pratyakṣa / mngon sum) such as 
visual form and so forth do really exist, because the faculties of sense such as the eyes, etc. that ap-
prehend them do exist. These faculties of sense that exist must necessarily engage with their own 
objects; objects like form, etc. with which these [sense faculties] engage are [thus] perceptible’. CŚT, 
Dbu ma ya 201b: yul gzugs la sogs pa mngon sum dag ni yod pa kho na ste de’i ‘dzin par byed pa mig la 
sogs pa’i dbang po yod pa’i phyir ro // yod par gyur pa’i dbang po ‘di rnams ni gdon mi za bar rang gi 
yul la ‘jug par ‘gyur dgos la / gang du de rnams ‘jug pa srid pa gzugs la sogs pa don de dag ni mngon 
sum yin no / bshad par bya ste. 
40 Gal te dbang po rnams kyis yongs su gcod par nus par ‘gyur na ni gzugs la sogs pa’i don dag tu ‘gyur 
ba zhig na ‘gyur ba nyid kyang ma yin no // ji ltar zhe na, ‘di na mig la sogs pa lnga po ni spyir ‘byung ba 
las gyur pa nyid du nye bar ston la /de rnams kyi bya ba ni yul tha dad pas tha dad pa zhig go // ‘di ltar mig 
gis gzugs kho na mthong gi sgra mi thos la / rna bas kyang sgra thos kyi gzugs mi mthong ngo //. 
41 Gal te de ltar mig la sogs pa rnams mi srid na / de’i phyir ji ltar mig la sogs pa’i dbang po ‘di 
rnams las kyi rnam par smin pa’i ngo bor rnam par gzhag ce na / ci kho bo cag gis ‘di rnams kyi rnam 
par smin pa’i ngo bo nyid bkag gam / gal te mig la sogs pa rnams ‘gog par sgrub pas de ji ltar ma bkag 
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Here is one of the clearest articulations that Candrakīrti’s critique of epistemological 
foundationalism entials the rejection of the intrinsic natures of the faculties of sense. 
But it does not ential the rejection of the faculties of sense per se. This passage 
therefore makes it clear that Candrakīrti does not reject the existence and epistemic 
efficacy of the faculties of sense. Therefore sensory perceptions, since they are 
causally conditioned, dependently arise
Candrakīrti’s critique of foundationalism also denies the epistemic validity of 
sensory perception with respect to ultimate reality. The Samādhirājasūtra reads: ‘The 
eyes, ears and nose are not reliable cognitions. The tongue, body and mind are also 
not reliable cognitions. If these sensory faculties were reliable cognitions, of what 
purpose would the noble path serve to anyone?’ (Mdo sde da 20b).42 Commenting on 
this sūtra in the Madhyamakāvatāra (MA 6.30), Candrakīrti writes: 
If ordinary cognitions were reliable cognitions (pramāṇas), then the mundane cognitions 
would see reality as it is. Then what necessity would there be for those other noble beings 
(āryas)? What purpose would the noble path serve? It makes no sense that fools are reliable 
cognitions. (Dbu ma ‘a 205b; Candrakīrti 1996, 156)43
The two passages are interpreted very differently by Tibetan Mādhyamikas such 
as Go rampa Bsod nams Senge (1969, 375, 382),44 Stag tsang Lots ba (2001, 156–
58),45 Dge ‘dun Chos ‘phel (1990, 161),46 and others who rule out the possibility of 
any account of conventional epistemic authority in the Prāsaṅgika. Careful reading of 
Candrakīrti’s passage and the relevant sūtra literature does not, however, support this 
line of interpretation. On Candrakīrti’s reading, these two texts reject the authority of 
ordinary uncritical perceptual cognitions as epistemic warrants only with reference 
ce na, kho bo cag gi rnam par dpyod pa don rang bzhin tsol ba lhur byed pa nyid kyi phyir ro // kho bo 
cag ni ‘dir dngos po rnams rang gi ngo bos grub pa ‘gog gi mig la sogs pa byas shing rten cing ‘brel 
par ‘byung ba’i las kyi rnam par smin pa nyid ni mi ‘gog pa’o // de’i phyir de yod pas gang zhig rnam 
par smin pa nyid du bsnyad pas mig la sogs pa yod pa nyid do //.
42 Mig dang rna ba sna yang tshad ma min / lce dang lus dang yid kyang tshad ma min / gal te 
dbang po ‘de dag tshad yin na / ‘phags pa’I lam gyis su la ci zhig bya //.
43 Gal te ‘jig rten tshad ma yin na ni/ ‘jig rten de nyid mthong bas ‘phags bzhan gyis / ci dgos 
‘phags pa’i lam gyis ci zhig bya / blun po tshad mar rigs pa’ang ma yin no (6.30). 
44 ‘on na kun rdzob ‘jal ba’i tshad ma med par ‘gyur zhing / de’ang ‘dod na tshig gsal las / de’i de 
ltar tshad ma bzhi las ‘jig rten gyi do rtogs par rnam par ‘jog pa yin no / zhes gsungs pa dang ‘gal lo 
zhe na / de ni ‘jig rten la ltos nas tshad ma yin pa’i don yin gyi dbu ma pa rang gi bden pa gnyis su phyi 
ba’i tshe tshad ma min te / yul brdzun pa mthong ba dang / yul can tshad ma yin pa ‘gal ba’i phyir ro/.
45 Yul kun rdzun dang yul can bslu med ‘gal / yul der ‘khrul dang de la tshad ma ‘gal / in glossing 
this verse, he writes: thal ‘gyur rang lugs la kun rdzob rdzun par rtogs bzhin pas kun rdzo kyi yul kun 
rdzob zhing bslu bar ‘dod pa dang de’i yul can gyi blo bslu med kyi tshad mar ‘dod pa ‘gal te / yul de 
bslu chos yin na blo de tshad mar song ma srid pa’i phyir / dper na skra shad snang pa’i blo bzhin no /.
46 Yod med blo yis bzhag pa’i shes bya dang / bden rdzun yul la ltos pa’i tshad ma gnyis / gcig gi 
rdzun khungs gcig la gtad mthong nas / tha snyad tshad grub ‘job la blo ma bde // ma brtag ma dpyad 
‘jig rten rnam gzhag dang / brtags shing dpyad pa’i grub mtha’i gzhung lugs gnyis / gcig gi rtsa ba 
gcig la thug mthong na / tha snyad tshad grub ‘jog la blo ma bde //.
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to ultimate truth or ultimate knowledge on the grounds of their inability to apprehend 
ultimate truth and the absurd consequence that would follow if they did. Candrakīrti 
makes this point even more explicit in the MA 6.31: 
Mundane consciousness is not authoritative [with regards to the ultimate] in all respects. 
Therefore, mundane consciousness does not undermine reality. If mundane objects that 
exist in virtue of being known by mundane cognition are contradicted by it, they are 
undermined by mundane cognition. (Dbu ma ‘a 205b; Candrakrti 1996)47
Glossing this verse in his commentary on 6.31, Candrakīrti makes the point even 
clearer: ‘With reference to reality as it is, ordinary cognitions are not authoritative 
in any sense. Nor is it the case that reality as it is can be undermined by worldly 
cognitions’ (1994, 114–15).48 Candrakīrti’s stress is on the relation between mundane 
cognitions and reality as it is. ‘Mundane cognitions’ are conventional cognitions, 
‘reality as it is’ is ultimate truth, and their relation is exactly what he denies. 
Here it is very clear that Candrakīrti rejects the authority of perception with its 
reference to ultimate truth, but not on account of its knowledge of conventional truth, 
and it is this knowledge that must be shown to be repudiated if Candrakīrti is to be 
interpreted as denying the epistemic authority of perception altogether. This must be 
so since in Candrakīrti’s theory of perception the authority of perceptual cognition 
arises from its ability to ascertain conventional truths as its principal objects, but not 
by its ability to ascertain ultimate truth or even the svalakṣaṇas / svabhāvas.
Perception as conceptual
Finally, one of the most central aspects of the Pramāṇika’s theory of perception is the 
claim that perception is invariably non-conceptual, a claim that affects its cognitive 
reliability. Candrakīrti rejects this claim and proposes the view that says perceptions 
are, by and large, conceptual, and still they can be reliable cognitions. 
In the final section of this paper, we turn to Candrakīrti’s defence of this crucial 
claim. First we will briefly consider Candrakīrti’s objection against the Pramṇika’s 
theory. Then we will turn to Candrakīrti’s arguments. The objection consists of a two-
pronged approach: the first one provides reductio arguments to show that there is no 
valid reason to support the Pramṇika’s theory. 
It is makes no sense [for the Pramāṇika] to conceive perception (pratyaka) as a reliable 
cognition (pramāṇa), because then you accept that perception (pratyakṣa) is cognition that 
is devoid of conception. This is not how even the mundane convention works, and you 
47 Rnam kun ‘jig rten tshad min de yi phyir / De nyid skabs su ‘jig rten gnod pa med / ‘jig rten 
don ni ‘jig rten grags nyid kyis / gal te sel na ‘jig rten gyis gnod ‘gyur //6.31//.
48 de kho na nyid kyi skabs su ‘jig rten rnam pa thams cad du tshad ma ma yin zhing / de kho na 
nyid kyi skabs su ‘jig rten gyi gnod pa yang ma nyin no //. 
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nevertheless aspire to explain reliable cognition (pramṇa) and perceptible (prameya) in 
the mundane context. (PP 1.3; Candrakīrti 2003, 55)49 
Candrakrti’s reductio argument runs like this: because the Pramṇika only accepts 
pratyakṣa as a cognition that is devoid of conception, it makes no sense to define 
pratyakṣa as a reliable cognition (pramṇa), because mundane convention has objects, 
that is, things that are perceptible (mngon gyur) as real pratyaka (mngon sum dgos), 
whereas the subject, that is, sensory cognition that is conceptual in nature, is only 
considered pseudo pratyaka (mngon sum btags pa ba). The Pramṇika’s claim that 
pratyaka is an exclusive cognition devoid of conception is therefore incompatible 
with mundane convention. 
‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’s Tshigs gsal stong thun explains Candrakīrti’s reductio 
argument as follows. The claim that only cognition that is devoid of conception is 
pratyaka, and the claim that pratyaka is pramṇa both contradict mundane epistemic 
convention. In the mundane convention, when the object is perceived by virtue 
of a direct experience (mngon sum du myong stobs), it necessarily entails a direct 
perception (mngon sum du rtogs pas khyab), but surely this does not require the 
cognition to be devoid of conception. There are, in fact, innumerable cases in which 
conception apprehends its objects by virtue of direct experience (myong stobs); as we 
say ‘I directly experience joy’. ‘I directly experience suffering.’ ‘I directly apprehend 
the objects.’ These are well-know reliable mundane cognitive facts, all of which are 
conceptual in nature. Therefore Candrakrti concludes: ‘[The Pramāṇika’s claim] is 
not even the way in which mundane convention operates’ (‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i 
Rdo rje 2006, 415).50
Candrakrti’s second objection of the Pramāṇika’s account rejects the textual 
authority upon which the Pramāṇika bases its exposition. Dignga claims that pratyaka 
is cognition devoid of conception since it has authoritative basis, and cites PP 1.3: 
One with visual cognition is aware of blue but does not [conceive] that it is blue. (Dbu ma 
a 25b)51 
49 Rrtog pa dang dral ba’i shes pa nyid mngon sum nyid du khas blangs pa’i phyir dang / des kyang 
‘jig rten pa’ tha snyad byed pa med pa’i phyir dang / ‘jig rten tshad ma dang gzhal bya’i tha snyad 
bshad par ‘dod pa’i phyir na mngon sum tshad mar rtog par ni don med pa nyid du ‘gyur ro //.
50 Des na rtogs dral gyi shes pa tsam mngon sum du ma zad mngon sum tshad mar khas blengs 
na’ang ‘jig rten gyi tha snyad dang mi mthun te / ‘jig rten na yul de mnyong stobs kyis rtogs na mngon 
sum du rtogs pas khyab la / de la rtog dral zhig mi dgos pa’i phyir / … bde sogs ltar rtog pas kyang 
mnyong stobs kyis rtogs pa du ma yod pa’i phyir dang / bde sogs ‘de mngon sum du du bdag gis myong 
ngo zhes ‘jig rten na grags pa’i phyir /.
51 Mig gi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pas sngon po shes kyi sngon po’o snyam du ni ma yin no 
shes bya (Cakurvijsamagi nla jnti no tu nlam iti) mig gi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pas 
sngon po shes kyi sngon po’i snyam du ni ma yin no /. Dan Arnold (2005, 459) reports that Dignga 
cites this passage in 1.4 of his commentary on the Pramṇasamuccaya.
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Also the Tatvasaṅgrahapañjika of Kamalala claims: 
The definition of pratyakṣa is devoid of error and conception because the Lord Buddha has 
said: ‘One with visual cognition has the awareness of blue but does not [conceive] that it is 
blue.’ By stating ‘awareness of blue’ [Lord Buddha] shows the subject is nonerroneous, thus 
unmistaken. By stating ‘but [it] does not [conceive] that it is blue’ [the Buddha] says that 
this cognition is devoid of conception since it does not apprehend objects in association 
with names. (Tshad ma ze pa 143b)52
In his response, Candrakrti says that the Pramāṇika’s conclusion is not supported 
by the text: 
The context of this text (gama / lung) is not where the definition of pratyaka is explained. 
The context is that the naïvety of the five sensory cognitions is explained. This text indeed 
does not prove that pratyakṣa is only a cognition that is devoid of conception [which the 
opponent wanted to show]. Therefore [the Pramṇika’s claim that pratyaka is devoid of 
conception] makes no sense. (PP 1.3 in Candrakīrti 2003, 55)53
Candrakrti rejects the Pramṇika’s interpretation of the text on the grounds that 
this quotation is misappropriated, that it is taken out of context, and that it does not 
deal with the definition of pratyaka at all. The proper context of the text is that it 
explains the naïve mode of engagement of the five sensory cognitions, that they lack 
critical or analytical capacity.
According to Candrakīrti, a reliable cognition can be associated with conceptuality, 
and therefore a conceptual cognition can be non-deceptive. This is because a non-
deceptive cognition is the definition of a reliable cognition, and this definition does 
not exclude conceptuality from being part of that cognitive process. 
Underscoring the critical importance of this criterion, both ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad 
pa and Dge shes Rgya mtsho’s definitions of reliable perceptual cognition omit the 
mention of ‘freedom of conceptuality’ (kalpanāpoḍha / rtog dral), which forms the 
essential part of the Pramāṇika’s definition of perception. Instead, the former asserts 
that a reliable perceptual cognition does not directly rely on any valid reasoning to 
apprehend the perceptible object, and it does not rule out the possibility of indirect 
conceptual involvement. 
Accordingly, ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa applies Candrakīrti’s generic definition of 
a reliable cognition to define reliable perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) as 
52 Mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid ni ‘khrul pa dang rtog pa dang dral ba nyid de / de yang bcom ldan 
‘das kyis mig gi zhes pa nas / zhes gsungs te / ‘di ltar sngon po shes zhes bya ba ‘dis ni phyin ci ma log 
pa’i yul can du bstan pa’i phyir ma ‘khrul bar brjod la / sngon po’i snyam du min no zhes bya b a ‘dis 
ni ming dang ‘drel ba’i don ‘dzin pa spangs pa’i phyir rtog pa dang dral ba brjod do //.
53 Mig gi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pas sngon po shes kyi sngon po’i snyam du ni ma yin no zhes 
bya ba’i lung yang mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid brjod pa’i don can gyi skabs ma yin pa nyid kyi phyir dang 
/ dbang po’i rnam par shes ba lnga po rnams blun po nyid du ston par byed pa nyid yin pa’i phyir / lung 
las kyang rtog pa dang dral ba’i rnam par shes pa kho na mngon sum nyid ma yin pas ‘de ni mi rigs so /.
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‘cognition by means of which, without directly relying on any valid reasoning as 
its cognitive support, is non-deceptive with regards to the perceptible (pratyakṣa / 
mngon sum), determinable object it apprehends’ (‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’i Rdo rje 
2006, 421).54 This definition proposes a constitutive correlation between a reliable 
perceptual cognition and the perceptible—the object of a direct experience. As Geshe 
Blo bzang Rgya mtsho’s definition has it: ‘It is an awareness (rig pa) that by the power 
of direct experience is non-deceptive with regards to its principle object’ (Dge shes 
Blo bzang Rgya mtsho 2002, 189).55 
Thus, ‘Jam dbyang Bzhad pa’s definition leaves open the possibility that an indirect 
conceptual cognition may be involved in a non-deceptive perceptual cognition. Geshe 
Blo bzang Rgya mtsho asserts that a non-deceptive cognition apprehends its principle 
object by the power of a direct experience. Again, he does leave open the possibility 
of the involvement of conceptuality in the process of direct experience. 
This open-ended definition of reliable cognition is vital to extend its scope to a 
wider range of epistemic processes that, while non-deceptive with regard to their 
perceptible objects, may be associated with conceptuality. The Prāsaṅgika therefore 
claims that a conceptual cognition may be epistemically valid and non-deceptive. 
The argument Candrakīrti employs to defend the conceptual involment in the 
perceptual process is that perception must necessarily entail the operations of both 
sensory consciousness and mental consciousness where the latter is conceptual 
in most part (excluding the exalted cognitive process in the meditative equipoise) 
and that there exists a time gap between mental cognition on the one hand and the 
sensory cognition and its object on the other. The mental cognition arises only after 
the sensory consciousness and its corresponding object have ceased, since only after 
having ceased does the visual consciousness and the object visually seen earlier 
externally arise, mental consciousness apprehending the mental representations 
of the object. Based on these cognitive processes we, according to Candrakīrti, 
conceptually construct perceptual judgements or notions about things we experience. 
This demonstrates why most perceptions are conceptual in nature. 
Candrakīrti introduces this argument in the CŚT XIII.322. Here the opponent asks: 
So then there is utterly no judgment of objects whatsoever? In his reply Candrakīrti 
says: ‘No, it is not nonexistent, for things exist without any intrinsic natures. [As 
Āryadeva puts it:] The object that is seen earlier and that the mind apprehends is like 
a mirage. This [cognition] is termed the aggregate of perception (saṃjāskandha)56 
54 Mngon sum mtshan ma’i mtshan nyid yod de / rang gi rten rtags yang dag la dngos su ma brten 
par rang gi ‘dzin stangs kyi yul gyi gzhal bya mngon sum pa la mi slu ba’i shes pa de de yin pa’i phyir /.
55 Rang yul gyi gtso bo la myong stobs kyis mi slu ba’i rig pa / mngon sum gyi blo’i mtshan nyi /.
56 Tillemans translates the term saṃjā as ‘notion’. I preferred ‘perceptual judgement’ since 
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for the evaluation of all dharmas’ (Dbu ma ya 205b).57 This is because ‘[w]hen visual 
consciousness ceases, after having arisen dependent on the eye and form, it ceases 
along with the sense faculty and the objects. This [visual consciousness] having 
ceased, the very object that had been seen earlier is [then] apprehended by the mind’ 
(Dbu ma ya 205b; Candrakīrti 1996, 350–51).58 
Candrakīrti develops his argument further in the CŚT XIII.322. Again the 
opponent objects: ‘But how could you admit that something that is not even present 
is being apprehended?’ ‘Like a mirage’, says Āryadeva. ‘Although there is not 
the slightest amount of water in a mirage, still, through the power of causes and 
conditions, a perception (saṃjā) that has the representation (ākāra) of water does in 
fact occur. Similarly’, argues Candrakīrti in the CŚT, ‘even though it has no intrinsic 
nature, like a mirage, a conceptual consciousness (vikalpaṃ vijānaṃ) arises with 
respect to the representation of the object that was [perceptually] apprehended 
earlier’ (Dbu ma ya 205b; Candrakīrti 1996, 350).59 Since conceptual consciousness 
is the cause of the determination of all dharmas, it is therefore called the aggregate 
of perception (saṃjāskandha), for in it are the representations (ākāra / snam pa) 
associated (saṃprayoga) with it or corresponding to perceptual judgement. ‘It should 
be understood’ says Candrakīrti’s CT, ‘that the determination of all dharmas are due 
to the power of the perceptual cognition, but it is not caused by the intrinsic nature 
(svabhāva) of the things, for intrinsic nature is impossible in all cases whatsoever’ 
(Dbu ma ya 205b; Candrakīrti 1996, 350).60
Candrakīrti’s argument makes it clear that a perceptual cognition is a conceptual 
process that interlocks the epistemic practices of both sensory consciousness and 
saṃjā carries the process of making the judgements based on various factors such as conceptual 
evaluations, inner dispositions, and representations. Candrakīrti’s emphasis in the current context is 
the representations appearing before the mental cognition that triggers the perceptual judgement to 
occur. 
57 Di ltar, sngar mthong ba yi don gang zhig / yid kyis smig rgyu ltar ‘dzin pa // de ni chos kun 
rnam gzhag la // ‘du shes phung po zhes bya’o //11.322//.
58 Gal te yul yongs su gcod pa ‘di rnam pa thams cad du med dam zhe na / med pa ma yin te / rang 
bzhin med pa’i dngos pos yod pa’i phyir ro // ‘di ltar / sngar mthong ba yi don gang zhig // yid kyis smig 
rgyu ltar ‘dzin pa // de ni chos kun rnam gzhag la // ‘du shes phung po zhes bya’o //322// ‘di na mig dang 
gzugs la brten nas mig gi rnam par shes pa skyes nas ‘gag pa na dbang po dang yul rnams dang lhan 
cig ‘gag par ‘gyur ro // de ‘gags na sngar mthong ba’i don gang yin pa de nyid phyis yid kyis ‘dzin to //.
59 Yang ji ltar nye ba ma yin pa la ‘dzin pa srid ce na / smig rgyu ltar zhes bya ba smros te / smig 
rgyu la chu bag tsam kyang med mod kyi / ‘on kyang rgyu dang rkyen gyi dbang gis chu’i rnam pa can 
gyi ‘du shes ‘byung ba nyid yin pa de bzhin du smig rgyu la bya ba ltar yod pa ma yin pa’i rang bzhin 
can gyi dngos po gzung zin pa la yang gang rnam par rtog pa can gyi rnam par shes pa skye ba de ni 
chos thams cad rnam par ‘jog pa’i rgyu yin no //.
60 Chos thams [206a] cad rnam par ‘jog pa’i rgyu nyid yin pa’i phyir na de nyid la ‘du shes phung 
po zhes bsnyad de / rnam pa de lta bu’i ‘du shes kyi khyad par dang mtsungs par ldan pa’i phyir ro // 
chos thams cad kyi rnam par gzhag pa yang ‘du shes kyi dbang gis shes par bya ba’i dngos po rang gi 
ngo bo’i rgyu can ni ma yin te rang bzhin rnam pa thams cad du mi rung ba’i phyir ro //.
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mental consciousness. The opponent’s objection (cited in the text above) assumes that 
the object in question must be intrinsically real and temporally durable, because an 
unreal and impermanent object could not act as the object of mental consciousness 
since it would have long ceased before it had been apprehended. 
Candrakrti illustrates his response by the example of a mirage. In a mirage 
there is not the slightest bit of water. Still it is reasonable, argues Candrakīrti, to 
form a cognition based on the representation or the image appearing to be water 
due to its causes and conditions; hence the conception of ‘mirage’ exists. Similarly, 
argues Candrakīrti, the object that was previously visually apprehended is unreal 
since it lacks intrinsic nature and is momentary since it is no longer present before 
the mental consciousness. The object has ceased along with the visual perception. 
Nevertheless the representation of the object is able to appear in the mental cognition 
as its intentional object. This is because both the object and the visual cognition are 
unreal and momentary instants and because all necessary conditions are satisfied. It 
consequently gives rise to a conceptual cognition (vikalpa vijānaṃ), and it is this 
conceptual consciousness that is responsible for the conceptual determinations or 
evaluations of all dharmas.
There is another aspect without which the perceptual cogniton cannot operate, 
namely consciousness. When the opponent asks, ‘If that were the case, the aggregate 
of perception would exist by its intrinsic nature, for if it did not exist, then one could 
not determine any dharmas’, Candrakīrti replies: 
The perception is itself also associated with the consciousness and thus does not exist 
without the consciousness. Consciousness, in turn, does not exist by its intrinsic nature, 
since it is not established without the perception. This is so because, [as Āryadeva states,] 
‘[t]he mind arises dependent on the eye and form, like an illusion (māyā)’. (Dbu ma ya 
206a)61 
Indeed, there is, as Candrakīrti’s CŚT explains, no consciousness that functions 
as the basis of the action of arising prior to its arising. When conditions such as 
the eyes and forms are available, consciousness, since it has no intrinsic nature, 
can nevertheless arise62 because the action of arising cannot be set in motion if it 
is intrinsic. Candrakīrti therefore says that what we can ascertain from this is that 
61 Gal te de lta na ni ‘o na ‘du shes kyi phung po rang bzhin gyis yod pa yin te de med na ni chos 
thams cad rnam par gzhag par mi nus so zhe na / brjod par bya ste / ‘du shes de yang rnam par shes 
pa dang mtsungs par ldan pa’i phyir rnam par shes pa de ma gtogs par med la / rnam par shes pa de 
yang ‘du shes de ma gtogs par ma grub pa’i phyir rang gi ngo bos med do // ‘di las kyang yin te / gang 
gi phyir / mig dang gzugs la brten nas yid // sgyu ma bzhin du skye bar ‘gyur //323ab//.
62 Tillemans has translated this passage thus: ‘Now, this consciousness does [nonetheless] arise’ 
(1990, 194). This conclusion seems to follow from the argument advanced, but the text does say 
otherwise. 
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consciousness has the quality of an illusion (Dbu ma ya 206a).63 When one examines 
consciousness in just the way in which it is perceived, then it can be ascertained that 
consciousness resembles a young girl created by magical illusions in that it too does 
not have any intrinsic nature. So, in Candrakīrti’s view, it is completely accurate to 
assert that ‘[l]ike an illusion cognition arises dependent on the eye and form’. If, 
however, the cognition did have an intrinsic nature, then as Āryadeva’s CŚT XIII.322 
states: ‘What has a real existence, could not be said to be an illusion’ is true (Dbu ma 
ya 206a; Candrakīrti 1996, 351).64
Stating the arguments in brief: Candrakīrti argues for two things: First, he argues 
that perception is empty of intrinsic nature and that it may be conceptual because it 
arises dependent on the culmination of a wide range of conditions, including non-
conceptual sensory and conceptual mental consciousnesses. Perception is empty 
of intrinsic nature on the grounds that it depends on mental consciousness, without 
which the former cannot exist since without consciousness there cannot be so-called 
perceptual cognition. 
Second, he argues that consciousness is also empty of intrinsic nature because 
it in turn depends on sensory perception and objects, etc. Candrakīrti therefore 
proposes that consciousness is illusory since it arises just like the emergence of a 
young illusory girl created by a magician. There is no girl to be found in any of the 
conditions out of which the magician creates an illusory young girl; nevertheless, an 
illusion of a young girl does exist due to the force of its conditions. Similarly, says 
Candrakīrti, there is no consciousness to be found anywhere in the conditions that 
gave rise to its existence—neither in the sensory perceptions nor in the objects nor 
in their representations; still, consciousness with its cognising ability does come into 
existence when all its conditions are present. 
Candrakīrti also cites the Sayutta Nikāya in the CŚT (Dbu ma ya 206ab), saying 
that when an illusionist at the crossroads creates various magical things such as 
elephants, a person endowed with vision sees the magical tricks being displayed, 
but upon critical reflection the elephant appears to him as nonexistent (asat), empty 
(rikta), insignificant (tuccha), and coreless (asāra). In the same way, whatever 
consciousness one takes, be it a temporal or spatial, outer or inner, faraway or nearby, 
63 Gang zhig skye bar bya ba’i rten nyid du ‘byung bar ‘gyur ba rnam par shes pa de skye ba’i snga 
rol na ni yod pa ma yin te / mig la sogs pa’i rkyen rnams yod kyang rnam par shes pa’i rang gi ngo bo 
med par skye ba’i bya ba mi ‘jug pa’I phyir skye ba mi rigs na / rnam par shes pa ‘di ni skye ba ma yin 
no // de’i phyir sgyu ma’i chos nyid las ma gtogs par ci zhig nges par bya bar nus …
64 Ji ltar dmigs pa de ltar rnam par dpyad pa la rang gi ngo bos med pa’i phyir rnam par shes pa 
sgyu ma’i na chung dang ‘dra’o zhes bya bar nges par nus so // de’i phyir / mig dang gzugs la brten 
nas yid // sgyu ma bzhin du skye bar ‘gyur // zhes bya ba’i legs par gsungs pa yin no // yang gal te ‘di’i 
rang gi ngo bo zhig du ‘gyur na ni de’I tshe rang gi ngo bos / gang la yod pa nyid yod de // sgyu ma 
zhes byar mi rigs so //.
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upon closer reflection and analysis also appears to be nonexistent, insignificant, 
coreless, impermanent, void (śūnya), and selfless (anātman). 
Conclusion
Having developed the arguments and defended the Prāsaṅgika’s theory of perception 
without the need of any foundationalism, Candrakīrti closes chapter XIII of CŚT with 
this dramatic conclusion. 
[Opponent]: It is astonishing that on the one hand faculties of sense can in no way apprehend 
objects and that on the other hand consciousness is produced dependent on the eye and 
various forms. 
[Candrakīrti’s reply]: Is this the only astonishing thing that you have observed? Aren’t 
the following astonishing? A sprout cannot reasonably arise from a seed that has ceased 
to exist or from one that has not ceased to exist, and yet the sprout does [indeed] arise 
dependent on the seed. Similarly, a volitional action (karma) that has been performed and 
accumulated cannot abide anywhere once it has ceased, but nevertheless from a volitional 
action that ceased to exist hundreds of thousands of eons ago there does manifestly arise 
an effect. Furthermore, vases and such [objects], if examined by the fivefold analysis as to 
whether they are identical with or different from their causes, cannot possibly exist, but due 
to dependent designation (upādāya prajapti) they are nevertheless suitable for performing 
actions such as containing and scooping honey, water, and other such [liquids]. So therefore 
when there is nothing astonishing on earth for the wise, then what is so amazing about the 
apprehension of the faculties of sense? (Dbu ma ya 207a)65
As we can see in the text, the conclusion Candrakīrti arrives at, after considering 
his arguments, astonishes his opponent, but not Candrakīrti himself. The contrast 
in their conclusions signifies the divide between the epistemological projects of 
the Prāsaṅgika’s non-foundationalism and the Pramāṇika’s foundationalism. The 
Prāsaṅgika’s opponent advances arguments in an attempt to prove that sensory 
perceptions effectively function as reliable cognitions because of the intrinsic nature 
of the cognitions or of the objects. The opponent believes that only such a privileged 
and robust ontological foundation would allow perceptions to become a reliable 
epistemic cognition. This is so for the opponent, because only when the intrinsic 
reality of perceptual cognitions and the objects is established would the force of 
mutual dependency be established between the two: the senses and their objects. 
65 Ci nas kyang dbang po rnams yul ‘dzin pa mi srid pa mig dang gzugs la brten nas mig gi rnam 
par shes pa yang skye’o zhes bya ba ‘di ni ngo mtshar ba zhig go // brjod par bya ste / ci ‘di kho na ngo 
mtshar gyi gang ‘gags pa dang ‘gag bzhin pa’i sa bon las myu gu ‘byung bar mi rigs la sa bon la /.
brten nas myu gu skye ba yang yin pa dang / de bzhin du byas shing bsags pa’i las ‘gags nas yun 
shin tu ring por lon pa la ‘gar yang gnas pa med mod kyi / ‘on kyang ‘gags nas bskal pa du mas chod 
pa’i las las kyang ‘bras bu dngos su ‘byung ba dang bum pa la sogs pa rnams rang gi rgyu las de nyid 
dang gzhan du rnam pa lngar dpyad pa na yod pa ma yin mod kyi / de lta na yang brten nas brtags pas 
sbrang rtsi dang chu dang ‘o ma ‘dzin pa dang ‘chu ba la sogs pa’i bya ba la rung bar ‘gyur ba ‘di ci 
ngo mtshar ba zhig gam / de’i phyir de ltar na / gang tshe mkhas la sa stengs na // ngo mthsar can min 
cang med pa // de tshe dbang rtogs de ‘dra la // ya mtshan zhes bya ci zhig yod //234//.
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Candrakīrti however advances his arguments by insisting that perceptions 
effectively function as reliable epistemic resources strictly on the grounds that they 
are unreal and lack any intrinsic nature, for only such an exclusive ontological reason 
allows the perceptual faculties to become reliable epistemic resources. This is so for 
Candrakīrti because only when the sensory perceptions and objects are proven empty 
of any intrinsic reality would we able to justify their existence and epistemic efficacy 
through the force of dependent co-arising. Candrakīrti therefore categorically refuses 
to attribute any intrinsic reality to things and cognitions and consistently argues that 
even the slightest reification of the faculties of sense, consciousness, and objects 
would render them causally ineffective and hence would rob them of their ability to 
perform any epistemic function. 
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